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SALVAGING THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN SEVEN EASY STEPS
Michael Tonry*

The federal sentencing guidelines are salvageable,
and without repeal or amendment of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984. Many people appear to believe
that the only sentencing policy options for the federal
courts are retention of the current guidelines substantially as is or repeal of the Sentencing Reform
Act. This belief, which is mistaken, is encouraged by
the U.S. Sentencing Commission. In its December.
1991 report on its self-evaluation of the first four
years guidelines experience, for example, the Commission attributes opposition to the guidelines to
"resistance ... on the part of some federal judges
and others involved in the sentencing process to
the need for and wisdom of the statutory scheme
for sentencing reform enacted by Congress in the
1984 Sentencing Reform Act."'
If the Commission were right, if the only choices
were between the current guidelines and statutory
repeal, judges' despair about the guidelines would
be warranted; outright repeal of the Act in the
foreseeable future appears unlikely. However there
is another choice, a middle ground. Under the
existing legislation, many of the Commission's policy
decisions could have been otherwise. Guidelines
could have been, and still can be, fashioned that
would reduce sentencing disparities but not routinely require judges to impose sentences that they
consider unjust. Other sentencing commissions
faced the issues that the Commission faced, and
arrived at different policy conclusions. If the
Commission were now to look at and learn from
experience elsewhere, it could remedy many of the
guidelines' current problems.
Many features of the current guidelines that
judges find most objectionable result not from the requirements of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 but
from the Commission's policy decisions. This article
describes seven such decisions that could have been
made otherwise and that together produce the
combination of rigidity and harshness that have
driven many judges and prosecutors to resent the
guidelines and often to circumvent them. Below I
discuss those decisions and other, more palatable,
options that were available to that the Commission:
1. giving the prosecutor sole discretion to decide
when defendants are eligible for sentence
reductions for substantial assistance to the
government (Guidelines, Sect. 5K1.1);
2. nullifying the statutory presumption (Sect.
99(j)) against imprisonment of first offenders
Sonosky Professor of Law and Public Policy, University
of Minnesota.
*

"not convicted of a crime of violence or an
otherwise serious offense" by defining as
"serious" many offenses that typically received
probation before the guidelines took effect;
3. treating sentences to probation as "zero
months imprisonment" and thereby triggering
statutory Section 994(b)(2)'s provision that "if a
sentence specified by the guidelines includes a
term of imprisonment," the top of the guideline
range may not exceed the bottom by the greater
of 25 percent or 6 months;
4. adopting "relevant conduct" as the basis for
applying guidelines rather than the offense of
conviction;
5. providing guidelines only for imprisonment
and, to a much lesser extent than before the
guidelines took effect, probation; there are no
guidelines for fines as stand-alone sanctions or
for any intermediate punishments;
6. raising sentencing severity generally, in order
to incorporate mandatory penalty provisions into
the grid, rather than having the mandatories
operate as trumps;
7. adopting a 43-level sentencing grid which
inevitably looks like a sentencing machine,
arbitrary, impersonal, and mechanical, and
reduces the credibility of the guidelines in the
eyes of judges and others.
None of these decisions was required by the Act.
Except for the decision to incorporate mandatory
penalties into the guidelines, none of them necessarily implies greater or lesser severity in sentences.
They are simply technical or technocratic decisions
that the Commission made, that it could have made
otherwise, and that can today be changed. Of the
seven decisions, the first three involve statutory interpretations; the rest involve what might be called the
architecture of sentencing guidelines. Most involve
issues that have confronted sentencing commissions
in Canada, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
Washington.
I. Substantial Assistance Motions. The Commission, not the Congress, conditioned sentence
reductions for assistance to the government on prosecutorial motions. Statute section 994(n) directs the
Commission to "assure that the guidelines reflect the
general appropriateness [of sentence reductions] to
take into account a defendant's substantial assistance
in the investigation or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense." Although the
statute says nothing to suggest that the prosecutor
should have sole authority to decide when and
whether substantial assistance has been provided,
Guidelines Section 5K1.1 provides: "upon motion of
the government stating that the defendant has
provided substantial assistance ...the court may
depart from the guidelines."
By amending Section 5K1.1 to substitute the word
"when" for the words "upon motion of the govern-
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ment stating that," the Commission would be acting
consistently with the statute and would empower
judges to exercise independent judgment when
controversies arise as to whether assistance has been
provided and, if so, whether it has been substantial.
II. The First-offender Nonincarceration Presumption. As a result of its express policy decision
to increase the use of incarceration, the Commission
largely overrode a statutory presumption that nonviolent first offenders should receive nonincarcerative sentences. Statute Section 994(j) directs the
Commission to "insure that the guidelines reflect the
general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other
than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is
a first offender who has not been convicted of a
crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense."
Confronted by its own empirical research showing
that many first offenders were sentenced to probation
before the guidelines took effect, 2 which the Commission described as a "problem," the Commission
devised its own definition of "serious." Here is how
the Commission describes what it did: "The Commission's solution to this problem has been to write
guidelines that classify as serious many offenses for
which probation previously was given and provide
for at least a short period of imprisonment in such
cases." (Guidelines Introduction, Section 4(c))
The Commission's rationale for overriding the
Congressional presumption was that the courts had
in the past ordered probation for "inappropriately
high percentages" of white collar offenders, including such crimes as "theft, tax evasion, antitrust
offenses, insider trading, fraud, and embezzlement."
The weakness in this rationale is that it did not reflect
the real world of the federal courts. Antitrust, insider
trading, and tax evasion represent a small percentage
of offenders who received probation before the
guidelines took effect. The people who were hurt,
swept into the Commission's "white collar" net,
were people convicted of immigration offenses,
minor postal thefts and property crimes, low-level
bank-teller embezzlers, and others who bear no
discernible resemblance to Ivan Boesky, Leona
Helmsley, or Michael Milken. Thus when the
Commission overrode the first-offender presumption
language, it did so on a false policy premise.
An easy solution, well within the authority of the
Commission, is available. Even if the current
guidelines were changed in no other respect, the
Commission could add a new section to Part K of the
guidelines providing:
If the defendant is a first offender who has not
been convicted of a crime of violence or an
otherwise serious crime, the court may depart
from the guidelines in order to impose a sentence
other than imprisonment.
The proposed language tracks Section 994(j)'s
statutory language and would allow the trial and
appellate courts to determine when nonviolent first
offenses are otherwise so serious that the nonincarceration presumption is overcome.

III. Probation as "Zero Months Imprisonment." A third critical choice made by the Commission that had radical consequences and was not
required by Congress concerned the seemingly
innocuous and for most purposes entirely theoretical
question whether probation is a generically different
kind of sentence from imprisonment or whether a
sentence to probation is a sentence of "zero months
imprisonment". The Commission took the second
position and thereby eliminated probation as a
stand-alone sentence for all but the most trifling
crimes. This seemingly obscure conceptual point
was made important by statute Section 994(b)(2)
which provided: "if a sentence specified by the
guidelines includes a term of imprisonment, the
maximum of the range established for such a term
shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more
than the greater of 25 percent or six months."
If probation is not a sentence of zero months imprisonment, Section 994(b)(2) has no relevance. A
guideline could, for a specific offense/criminal history combination, specify authorized sentences ranging from probation to a prison sentence up to 24 or
36 months. If, however, probation is a zero months
prison sentence, then Section 994(b)(2) applies and a
maximum range of "0 to 6 months" is the result.
Little can be said in favor of the Commission's
decision that probation is a form of imprisonment; it
required a tortured interpretation of words whose
contrary conventional meaning is clear. The
common understanding is that probation is a
different form of punishment, one that judges often
consider as an alternative for imprisonment. The
Commission's interpretation is conceptually
muddled; if fines were permitted by the guidelines
as stand-alone punishments, the Commission would
presumably define a fine as a sentence of zero
months incarceration. Whether that would be more
forced than so regarding probation I don't know, but
it is exactly the same issue. For both fines and
probation, prison exists as a backup to be used when
offenders fail to comply with conditions; in both
cases, when conditions are observed, offenders are
entitled to absolute discharges. The Commission's
interpretation is also inconsistent with the firstoffender nonimprisonment presumption because it
narrows the relevance of that presumption to a tiny
fraction of federal offenders.
IV. "Real Offense Sentencing." The single
feature of the federal sentencing guidelines that state
judges and judges and judicial administrators
outside the United States find most astonishing is the
Commission's policy decision to base guideline
application on the defendant's "relevant conduct,"
including conduct alleged in charges that were
dismissed or that resulted in acquittals or that were
never filed. More than once when describing the
relevant conduct system to government officials and
judges outside the United States, I have been accused
of misreporting or exaggerating.
Every sentencing guidelines commission to date
has considered whether to adopt a "relevant con-
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duct" or "real offense" approach as a means to offset
prosecutorial power to influence guideline sentencing by decisions about charges to file or drop. The
potential problems posed by plea bargaining under
guidelines are real. Nonetheless, the sentencing
commissions in Canada, Minnesota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, and Washington unanimously rejected
real offense sentencing and based guidelines on
convicted offenses.
Real offense sentencing has been unanimously
rejected elsewhere for two primary reasons. First,
there is the Caesar's wife problem that courts must
not only do justice but be seen to do justice. Even
though prosecutorial power under guidelines has
everywhere been seen as a potential problem, adoption of a system that divorces punishment from the
substantive criminal law, the law of evidence, and
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
has everywhere been seen as a bigger and much
more important problem. Second, other sentencing
commissions have been doubtful that real offense
sentencing would be an effective counter to prosecutorial power. Experience under the federal guidelines confirms that skepticism: probably the single
most common judicial complaint about the guidelines is that they
have shifted sentencing power to
3
the prosecutor.
The Commission offered three major reasons for
adopting the relevant conduct approach, all demonstrably mistaken or misconceived. The first, that real
offense sentencing would prevent a shift of power to
the prosecutor, has been discussed.
The second, exemplified by Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241 (1949), is that judges have authority to
look beyond the conviction offense and have always
done so. The problem with this argument is that
Williams was decided in the heyday of indeterminate
sentencing when judges were expected to individualize sentences; the guidelines, however, are a form of
determinate sentencing which is premised on the
notion that judges' discretion should be more narrowly constrained than in the era of indeterminate
sentencing. Thus, modem case law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the rationale of Williams has little
relevance to modem determinate sentencing.
The third was that the federal criminal law is
incomparably more complex than are state criminal
laws and that many federal offenses in their labels
and elements provide no meaningful basis for
measuring culpability. Mail and wire fraud and
RICO offenses are examples. If a majority of federal
offenders were convicted of mail fraud, the Commission's point might have been well taken. In practice,
however, drug crimes make up roughly half of the
federal criminal docket and much of the rest consists
of common law crimes like theft, robbery, and
embezzlement, and conceptually uncomplicated
crimes like immigration offenses. 4 Thus modem
federal criminal cases look much like state cases and
there is no more need for real offense sentencing in
the federal system than in the states.
There is no statutory mandate for real offense

sentencing. The Commission has authority to switch
to an offense-of-conviction system and could do so in
ways that address some of the concerns that underlay
their relevant conduct approach. To deal with the
problem of statutes that are too generically phrased,
the Commission could add additional elements
(firearms use, violence) to divide broadly defined
offenses into subcategories of different seriousness
and by rule require that the prosecutor allege those
additional elements and that they be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt or admitted. That is how
Minnesota, Washington, and Pennsylvania handled
this problem. To deal with exotic federal crimes like
mail fraud and RICO, the Commission could
establish special rules.
V. No Place for Intermediate Punishments. The
federal guidelines allow no independent role for
intermediate punishments like fines, house arrest,
intensively supervised probation, or community
service. The only free-standing sentences authorized
are prison and probation (and, as noted earlier, the
role allotted probation is limited).
Fines as independent sentences are conspicuously
absent. Although the Congress's first charge to the
Commission in statute Section 994(a)(1) was to
promulgate "guidelines for use by the court in
determining the sentence to be imposed.... including (A) a determination whether to impose a sentence
to probation, a fine, or a term of imprisonment,"
fines are nowhere authorized as a sole sentence for
individuals. Instead, Guidelines Section 5E1.2(a)
provides: "the court shall impose a fine in all cases,
except [when the defendant lacks ability to pay]."
Thus fines are available as add-ons to prison sentences or probation, but not as punishments in their
own right.
Nor do the guidelines authorize other nonincarcerative sanctions as independent sentences. Guidelines Part F (Sections 5F1.1-3) authorize community
confinement, home detention, and community
service, but only "as a condition of probation or
supervised release." The guidelines make no
mention of intensively supervised probation, which
is widely used in American states as an alternative to
imprisonment.
The absence of any provision in the guidelines for
imposition of fines and other nonincarcerative
intermediate punishments is remarkable. Many
federal crimes are especially appropriate for fines. In
many Western countries, the fine is the single most
often imposed punishment for many offenses including even some violent offenses. The "day-fine,"
calibrated both to the seriousness of the crime and to
the defendant's means, provides a tested mechanism
for use of fines in serious cases. Reasonable people
can differ whether in principle a fine is an appropriate sentence for, say, a serious assault; it is hard to
see how reasonable people can disagree that there are
some nontrivial crimes for which fines-which can
serve both deterrent and punitive purposes-are
uniquely suited. It won't do for the Commission to
respond that fines can be coupled with probation
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sentences, making a de facto stand-alone fine,
because the Commission restricted probation to only
a small proportion of federal defendants convicted of
minor crimes.
Similarly, there is much experience in the United
States and Western Europe with intermediate
punishments which the Commission could have
drawn on in setting guidelines for such punishments.
Sentencing commissions in Oregon, Pennsylvania
and Washington are incorporating intermediate punishments into their guidelines. A Commission task
force headed by Commissioner Helen Corrothers
offered concrete proposals for building intermediate
punishments into the guidelines so that judges would
have more options for better tailoring sentences to
meet the circumstances of individual defendants.'
The Commission has not acted on any of the Corrothers committee's major recommendations.
Had it the will, the Commission could easily
incorporate fines and intermediate punishments into
the federal guidelines. The state sentencing commissions have accumulated substantial experience on 6
this subject. There is a sizable scholarly literature.
Within a few months, the Commission could devise
guidelines for fines and other punishments scaled to
offense severity that judges could use in lieu of
otherwise-applicable prison sentences of up to three
years duration.
VI. Mandatory Penalties as "Trumps." The
Commission knowingly increased sentences for
many crimes by the way it handled mandatory
penalties. There are two ways to reconcile mandatories and guidelines; every other sentencing commission to date considered those options and every other
commission chose the option the Commission
rejected.
Here is the problem. Mandatory penalty provisions often call for minimum terms longer than past
practice and longer than a sentencing commission as
an independent body would prescribe. There are
two ways to handle this. The first is to develop a
comprehensive set of guidelines based on knowledge
of past practices and conscious policy decisions to
change past practice. If mandatory minimum
statutes require longer sentences than the guidelines
prescribe in individual cases, policy statements can
instruct the judge that the mandatory minimum
statute takes precedence and trumps the guidelines.
This approach, which every state sentencing commission adopted, has the advantage that it makes clear
when sentences uniquely result from application of
mandatory penalty statutes.
The other approach is to incorporate the statutory
minimums into the guidelines and scale all other
penalties around the mandatories. This has the effect
of increasing the severity of guideline sentences
generally. A metaphor shows why. Imagine a
sentencing guidelines grid as a lattice. Under the
mandatories-as-trumps approach, long minimum
sentences poke through the lattice and when they are
very long, tower above it. Under the Commission's
approach, the entire lattice is lifted, as if the manda-

tory minimums were posts, and the sentences for
many crimes not covered by the mandatory provisions are lifted also.
Here, too, there is an easy way to salvage the
federal guidelines: merely follow the lead of every
other sentencing commission and shift to the
mandatories-as-trumps approach.
VII. The 43-Level "Sentencing Machine." One
of the Commission's worst blunders was promulgation of the 43-level sentencing table in Chapter 5,
Part A. By being so large and giving an appearance
of arbitrary sentencing by numbers, it became one of
the guidelines' worst enemies.
Two major problems result from adoption of the
sentencing table. Both were foreseeable on the basis
of evaluation research concerning parole and
sentencing guidelines and on the basis of the
experience of earlier sentencing commissions. First,
and most important, the effectiveness of guidelines
systems depends on the willingness of officials to
accept and apply them. In other words, they must
be credible in the eyes of the officials who must use
them. If the logic of a guidelines grid is not apparent
on its face, if it looks mechanical and arbitrary,
judges and others are likely to be alienated. In the
sentencing policy literature this is referred to as the
problem of the "sentencing machine." Judges and
lawyers in sentencing believe their function is to
impose fair, deserved, and appropriate punishments.
Sentencing by use of a sentencing machine is the
antithesis of this and a guideline grid that conjures
up images of mechanical and arbitrary sentencing
standards and processes foreseeably will alienate
judges and others.7 Judges who are alienated from a
sentencing guidelines system are unlikely to invest
great effort in protecting the integrity of the system
from efforts of lawyers and others to circumvent it.
The problem of the sentencing machine is not
new. Partly because of it, state guidelines systems
have many fewer offense-severity levels. Minnesota's felony guidelines have ten. Pennsylvania's
guidelines, which also cover misdemeanors, have
ten. Washington State considered adopting a 26level guidelines grid and rejected it in favor of a 14level grid. The rhetorical question was asked,
"Could we plausibly explain to a judge why a level
16 crime is more serious than a level 15 crime?"
When the Washington commission realized that it
could not answer that question, it realized it had a
sentencing-machine problem and opted for a smaller
grid.
The second problem with a complicated guidelines system with an enormous sentencing grid is
that there will foreseeably be high error rates in
calculating guideline sentences. A major evaluation
of four parole guideline grid systems showed that
even simple grids produce significant levels of
inaccurate guidelines calculations.8 Complicated
grids produce high levels of calculation errors. That
this problem affects the federal guidelines is shown
by a recent Federal Judicial Center report on a
project in which 47 federal probation officers were
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asked to calculate "base offense levels" for hypothetical defendants described in the sample cases
used for discussion at the recent sentencing institute
for the Second and Eighth circuits. There were
enormous differences in the offense levels calculated. 9
Curiously, the Commission either did not know
or did not care about the formidable foreseeable
problems posed by creation of a sentencing machine.
The Guidelines Introduction merely notes, "The
Commission has established a sentencing table that
for technical and practical reasons contains 43
levels." The technical reasons mentioned include a
desire for overlapping guidelines ranges. No
mention is made of the likely effects of the grid on
judicial perceptions of the systems' wisdom or
desirability, or of the foreseeable problem of high
rates of error in guidelines application.
The sentencing-machine problem is, in principle,
fixable. However, unlike the solutions to the first
five problems discussed above, there is no solution
that does not involve a substantial overhaul of the
guidelines (this is also true of the mandatory
penalties problem). To avoid the problems of the
sentencing machine, the Commission will have to
develop and promulgate a much smaller, facially
more plausible grid.
A court could probably take judicial notice of the
widespread hostility of judges and lawyers to the
federal sentencing guidelines. The line that divides
vehement critics from vocal proponents follows no
pattern-it is not liberals versus conservatives,
Republican appointees versus Democratic appointees, judicial activists versus adherents of judicial
restraint. Partly this is because the guidelines have
no vocal proponents except members of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission and the U.S. Department of
Justice. Partly it is because objections to the guidelines transcend ideological and partisan differences.
The core objections are that the guidelines are too
rigid and too harsh, and too often force judges and
lawyers to choose between imposing sentences that
are widely perceived as unjust or trying to achieve
just results by means of hypocritical circumventions.
Judges are forced by the guidelines to choose between their obligation to do justice and their obligation to enforce the law. Many judges resent having
so often to make that choice. If the Commission

would make the five simple changes recommended
here, it would go a long way toward salvaging the
guidelines. If it made the two somewhat more
ambitious proposed changes, it might produce a
system of guidelines that could command the
support of judges and prosecutors and make far
likelier the achievement of the purposes of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
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